Fair warning—I’m getting out my soapbox.
Some of you may have already watched the Netflix documentary Trainwreck: The Astroworld Tragedy. If you haven’t, I highly recommend it—but be prepared to be angry. You should be angry, whether or not you work in events. There’s so much to unpack, I’m breaking this into two blog posts. This first one is focused on information you may not know—bear with me, it’s a lot, but it matters.
The Start of the Spiral
When the tragedy at Astroworld happened, I was interviewed by News Nation Prime. It was my first time being interviewed on national news and I was nervous. So I leaned into my superpower: research.
It took less than a minute to find red flags.
Let’s start at the beginning: there were no proper entrance procedures, and the entry points were far too narrow. In the documentary, you see people literally pushing down fences. Once that happened, any ability to control crowd numbers was gone. I was honestly shocked no one was seriously injured right then and there—although reports say a security guard and four attendees were treated for injuries.
Want to know how they staffed security? At 6 a.m., someone posted on social media asking for more help; around 100 people volunteered. They were given a t-shirt, but no training. By 8 a.m., Houston PD had already requested riot gear.
Meanwhile, the official Astroworld website promised COVID protocols, wristband checks, and full bag and body searches. None of that happened because of the surge through the gates. By 2 p.m., entrance protocols were completely abandoned. The headliner, Travis Scott, wasn’t even scheduled to go on until 8:45 p.m., but the problems had started 12 hours earlier.
What You Didn’t See in the Documentary
There’s confusion about the actual capacity of the venue. Some say 20,000; others say 200,000. Here’s what I found: the 20,000 is for the stadium (which wasn’t used for the festival). The outdoor venue was theoretically capable of holding 200,000 people—if there was nothing else in the space.
But there was a lot else: food vendors, rides, medical tents, two stages. Each one takes up space—and not just their footprint. You also need safety clearance zones around them. For example, a ride’s footprint includes not just its base but the full area it occupies while operating. All of that eats into your usable capacity.
At the time, Houston didn’t require an occupancy permit. Live Nation, the promoter, sold 50,000 tickets. But with so many people jumping fences, we honestly don’t know how many were actually there.
Design Flaws and Dangerous Layouts
Let’s talk layout. If you look at images of the festival, here’s what stands out:
- Minimal signage
- Poor lighting
- Only two water stations
- Limited exits
- 100-foot-wide quadrants
- Narrow access aisles
And the main stage? Not used all day. So when it was time for Travis Scott’s performance, everyone moved toward one focal point, funneling into those 100-foot quadrants—with no crowd monitoring and no signage to direct people across the space. Security started pulling people over fencing into narrow aisles—essentially making things worse.
By 4 p.m., 54 people had already been treated for injuries. Houston PD had flagged dangerous conditions. The Chief of Police met with Travis Scott to voice concerns. That’s four hours before the show even started.
Security—In Name Only
There are lots of conflicting reports about security numbers. Some say there were over 1,000 personnel, including Houston PD and two private firms. Technically, that aligns with the industry rule of thumb: one security staff member per 50–100 attendees.
But numbers aren’t everything.
You must match staff to your event. Peer security (a.k.a. untrained volunteers) requires more oversight. And guess what? Neither of the security companies hired were licensed in Texas. Some workers said they didn’t even know who to report to.
Who Was in Charge?
A lot of attention has been put on Travis Scott. And yes, his past behavior is a problem—he’s been charged twice with inciting crowds, and there was a crowd surge at his own Astroworld event in 2019.
That said, he hired Live Nation—the “world’s leading live entertainment company”—to run the show. He states in the documentary that he wasn’t qualified to plan the festival, so he hired a company that did have the expertise.
Let’s take a look at LiveNation:
- 200 deaths and 750 injuries reported at their events since 2006
- 10 OSHA violations between 2016–2019
- No certification requirements for project managers—just 3 or more years of experience
Yes, there was an emergency plan. It included scenarios like severe weather, active shooters, missing children, and unruly fans. But guess what it didn’t include? Crowd surges. One of the most common risks at concerts.
Even worse: the only people authorized to stop the show were the “concert’s executive producer and festival director.” Their names were not listed in the plan. That’s a massive oversight.
Back to the Layout
The layout was approved by the City of Houston and the Fire Marshal. Permits were issued for tents, pyrotechnics, food vendors, and street closures. But again—no capacity permit was required, just a safety plan filed with property owners.
So what happened during the show?
It started around 9 p.m.—a little late, but not unusually so. Within 15 minutes, Travis Scott stopped the show briefly for a distressed fan (we see this in the documentary). Reports say he paused two more times. But by 9:40 p.m., a mass casualty event had been declared by the police. Still, they didn’t stop the show—for fear of triggering a riot. My question is, aren’t they trained for that?
The concert finally ended at 10:15 p.m.—more than 30 minutes after that declaration.
Final Thoughts (for Now)
There’s still so much we don’t know. And if you have insights—please share. If you spot something I missed or got wrong—tell me. I’m here to learn, too. Most of all, I want to hear what you think. The good, the bad, the ugly. Let’s talk.
Your turn. GO.
The Barefoot Event Professor 
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